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LITIGATING THE VALIDITY AND
INFRINGEMENT OF SOFTWARE PATENTS
WILLIAM L. ANTHONY, JR.*
ROBERT C. COLWELL**
Much creative effort has been expended by Congress, state legislatures,
and individual attorneys to create proprietary rights in computer programs.
As a result, it is now established that computer programs can be protected
by patent, copyright, and trade secret law.' While the focus of this article
is on patent rights, and particularly, litigating the issues of validity and infringe-
ment of software patents, a broad overview of the various forms of software
protection is presented to place patent protection in perspective. With that
objective in mind, a brief comparison of copyright and trade secret protection
with patent protection follows. 2
I. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PATENT PROTECTION
AND OTHER FoRMs OF PROTECTION OF COMPUTER PROGRAMS
A. Patents
1. Introduction
Patent protection is unique with respect to both the breadth of protection
over a variety of different implementations of a patented program and the
reach of the protection to a broad class of potential misappropriators. The
advantages of patent protection of computer programs, however, are accom-
panied by several significant disadvantages. These disadvantages include the
cost of obtaining the patent, the delay inherent in prosecuting the patent
application to issue as a patent, and the stringent requirements of patentability
faced in obtaining and enforcing the patent.
2. The Breadth of Patent Protection
The most important advantage of patent protection is the breadth of the
protection provided. A patent on a computer program need not be limited
* Partner, Townsend and Townsend, San Francisco, California; B.S. (1961) Worcester
Polytechnic Institute; J.D. (1966) University of Connecticut; registered to practice before the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office; member of Michigan and California Bars.
** Partner, Townsend and Townsend, Palo Alto, California; B.S. (1969), M.S. (1970)
University of Kansas; J.D. (1973) Stanford University; Fegistered to practice before the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office; member of California Bar.
1. Another form of software protection, yet undergoing definition, is contract law. Under
contract theory, the end user of a software program, particularly a lessee or licensee, bargains
away some of his rights to use the program; for example, the right to rent the software or use
it on multiple CPUs. Such contractual bases for software protection are beyond the scope of
this article.
2. For a more detailed discussion of copyright and trade secret protection of computer
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to the manner of expression used by the programmer. Rather, the patent may
protect the broad concepts or ideas embodied in the program. Patent protec-
tion is typically expressed in broad terms which describe the overall organiza-
tion or function of a computer program. 3 Ordinarily, the patent will not be
limited to a specific implementation or specific instructional steps. No other
form of protection of computer programs provides so comprehensive a pro-
prietary right to the creator of the software.
4
3. The Reach of Patent Protection
Patent protection reaches deeply into the marketplace. It is capable of
providing relief against a broad class of potential misappropriators.5 No prior
fiduciary or contractual relationship between the patent owner and the poten-
tial misappropriator is required. The potential misappropriator need not have
programs, see Root, Protecting Computer Software in the '80's: Practical Guidelines for Evolv-
ing Needs, 8 RUTGERS J.C.& T.L. 205 (1981).
3. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); Matter of Application of Bradley, 600
F.2d 807 (C.C.P.A. 1979), aff'd, 450 U.S. 381 (1981); Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc.
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Del. 1983). The primary
claim in Matter of Application of Bradley is illustrative of the broad terms in which patent claims
are typically formed:
1. In a multiprogramming computer system having a main memory, a central
processing unit (CPU) coupled to said main memory, said CPU controlling the state
of a plurality of groups of processes being in a running, ready, wait or suspended
state, said computer system also having scratchpad registers being accessible to an
operating system for controlling said multiprogramming computer system, a data structure
for storing coded signals for communicating between said processes and said operating
system, and said scratchpad registers, said data structure comprising:
(a) first means in said data structure and communicating with said operating
system for storing coded signals indicative of an address for a selected one of said
processes;
(b) second means in said first means for storing coded signals indicating priority
of said selected one of said processes in relation to others of said processes for obtain-
ing control of said CPU when ready;
(c) third means in said data structure and communicating with said operating
system, for storing coded signals indicative of an address for a selected one of said
plurality of groups of processes; and
(d) fourth means coupled to said data structure and said scratchpad registers,
for generating signals causing the changing of information in said data structure and
said scratchpad registers.
600 F.2d at 809.
This claim is in "means plus function" format, a broad form of expression used to set forth
the boundaries of the protection afforded by the patent. The "means plus function" format,
for example, "second means ... for storing coded signals .... " is explicitly sanctioned by statute
and is deemed to cover "the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specifica-
tion and equivalents thereof." See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1982).
4. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1982). The patent constitutes "... a grant to the patentee, his
heirs or assigns, for the term of seventeen years ... of the right to exclude others from making,
using, or selling the invention throughout the United States...." Id. (Emphasis added).
5. In addition to proscribing the making, using or selling of a claimed invention, the patent
laws also prohibit the selling of certain components of a patented invention or the active induce-
ment of an infringement. See id. §§ 271(a)-(c).
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copied the program. In fact, the potential misappropriator may have designed
his program entirely independently of the patent owner, and without any prior
knowledge or notice of either the patent or the program protected by the
patent.
6
The scope of the patent owner's property right is measured by reference
to the claims at the end of the patent. The patent is infringed if even one
of the patent claims is broad enough to cover the program of the potential
misappropriator. Of course, a patent must be found valid as well as infringed
before a judgment against the misappropriator can be obtained.8
4. The Disadvantages of Patent Protection
Patent protection is not free of disadvantages. First, the drafting of the
application, the prosecution of the application before the Patent and Trademark
Office, and the government filing, issuance, and maintenance fees are each
costly relative to other forms of protection.9 It is unlikely that the issued patent
will be obtained for less than $5,000, and for complex programs, the cost
can exceed $10,000. Second, and in many cases more importantly, a substan-
tial delay prior to relief is inherent in the patent system. Because of the thorough
examination required and the workload of the Patent Office, the issuance of
a patent generally requires one to three years.'* With an extraordinary effort
on the part of the applicant, accompanied by a showing of actual misappropria-
tion of the invention, a patent may be issued in less than one year, but cer-
tainly not much less than one year."
After the patent is issued to the patent owner, he may for the first time
bring suit on the patent.' 2 In most cases, however, the courts will not provide
quick relief. As a general rule, preliminary injunctions are not granted in patent
cases unless the patent has been upheld in prior litigation or the patent has
been widely recognized by the industry.' 3 Neither of these showings can be
made in regard to newly issued patents. Accordingly, the patent owner cannot
expect monetary or injunctive relief until after a full trial on the merits. Once
the patent owner achieves victory at the trial level, his relief may be further
6. "It is, of course elementary, that an infringement may be entirely inadvertent and uninten-
tional and without knowledge of the patent. In this respect the law of patents is entirely different
from the law of copyright." Blair v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 291 F. Supp. 664, 670 (D. D.C.
1968). See also Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicon Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476, 478 (1947).
7. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(a)-(c) (1982).
8. See id. §§ 281-284.
9. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.16-1.21 (1984) (providing government filing, processing, issuance,
post-issuance and other fees).
10. The Official Gazette of June 26, 1984, stated that for Patent Examining Group 230,
a section of the Patent Office charged with examining information processing, storage, and retrieval
inventions, the oldest application awaiting action had been filed September 24, 1981. See OFF.
GAz. PAT. Oro. 133 (June 26, 1984).
11. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.102 (1984).
12. See 35 U.S.C. § 281 (1982).
13. See Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Davis-Edwards Pharmacal Corp., 443 F.2d 867 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 412 U.S. 929 (1971).
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postponed pending completion of an appeal should the trial court decide to
stay relief upon the posting of an appeal bond.' 4 In addition to the cost and
time involved in obtaining and enforcing patents on computer programs, the
nature of the patent system itself prevents trivial advancements from qualifying
for patent protection. To be patentable, a program must incorporate an ad-
vance which is nonobvious to a programmer of ordinary skill.'
5
One final significant disadvantage of patent protection bears mention.
Issuance of a patent discloses the program to the public, at least to an extent
which will allow a programmer of ordinary skill to duplicate the function of
the program. Until then, the commonly used methods for protecting the pro-
prietary interest of creators of software are predicated primarily upon secrecy
and the trade secret laws.' 7 That secrecy will be destroyed in whole or in part
upon issuance of the patent, possibly undoing carefully structured systems
for maintaining the exclusive ownership in the creator of the software.
Prior to publication, patent applications are maintained in secrecy. 8 Since
the issuance of a patent-its publication-usually occurs one to three years
after filing the application for the patent, the impact of publication is
diminished. 9 Moreover, trade secret protection can exist until the patent issues
14. See FED. R. CIrv. P. 62(d).
15. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1982). Section 103 provides, in part:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed
or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the sub-
ject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter
as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person
having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains....
Id.
16. See id. § 112, which provides in part:
The [patent] specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and
of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with
which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the
best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention....
Id.
17. For example, most mass-marketed software is protected by trade secret licenses, designed
to be executed by the licensee upon opening the package containing the software. The viability
of this form of license, particularly in the consumer market, is presently being tested in the courts.
18. 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1982). Section 122 provides:
Applications for patents shall be kept in confidence by the Patent and Trademark
Office and no information concerning the same given without authority of the appli-
cant or owner unless necessary to carry out the provisions of any Act of Congress
or in such special circumstances as may be determined by the Commissioner.
Id.
19. On the other hand, if a foreign patent is sought claiming benefit of the United States
filing date under section 119 of the Patent Act (the Act), publication may occur in the foreign
country as soon as 18 months following the filing of the corresponding American application.
See, e.g., Manual for the Handling of Applications for Patents, Designs and Trademarks




and presumably, the patent protection will be more than adequate to serve
the needs of the program owner thereafter. 20
5. The Suitable Candidates for Patent Protection
From the above, one readily concludes that relatively few programs are
appropriate subject matter for patent protection. Because patent proceedings
are expensive and time-consuming, the program should be commercially
important and should embody creative concepts which are expected to be long-
lived. Game programs, which may fade in popularity in a few months, likely
prior to issuance of a patent, are generally unsuitable for patent protection,
notwithstanding the great commercial potential that would otherwise justify
the expense of obtaining a patent. Similarly, application programs sold in a
rapidly evolving retail market are unlikely to be suitable candidates for patent
protection. Of course, with respect to either game or application programs,
fundamentally new features which will survive for many years may be accept-
able candidates for protection. In this regard, broad patent protection, such
as in the "means plus-function" format,2 may continue to cover fundamen-
tally new features even though subsequent enhancements of the program have
caused the implementation of the feature to evolve into a specifically different
form. Certainly some of the basic features of landmark spreadsheet, data base,
word processing and graphics programs will be with us for many years, not-
withstanding changes and enhancements. Accordingly, patent protection should
be given serious consideration with respect to the basic new features of such
programs.
In addition to the requirements of commercial importance and long life,
a suitable candidate program for patent protection should incorporate fun-
damentally new programming features or advantages. Programs which
demonstrate little creativity will probably not be sufficiently inventive to meet
the patentability requirements. Moreover, even if the patentability requirements
are met by a largely run-of-the-mill program, the resulting patent protection
likely will be narrow in scope, commensurate with the narrow advance. In
such cases, the narrow scope of the patent may not exceed the narrow scope
of copyright protection, and thus, patent protection of such a program loses
one of its main advantages over copyright protection.
In summary, the significant advantages provided by patents, with respect
to both the breadth and the reach of the protection, are tempting. Few pro-
grams, however, will possess the commercial importance, expected lifetime,
and novelty required to be suitable for patent protection. With respect to the
few that do, patent protection should be given serious consideration in view
of its superior breadth and reach.
20. If the eventually obtained patent protection is not of sufficient scope, the patentee need
not pay the patent issue fee; thus no patent will issue; and the program may remain a trade
secret. See Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 485.
21. See supra note 3 (defining "means plus function" format).
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B. Copyrights
One of the basic principles of copyright law is that copyright protects
only the manner of expression and not the underlying concept or idea embodied
in the expression.22 In regard to computer programs, this principle is easier
to state than to apply. While it is clear that copyright protection is directed
at the expression represented by the series of instructional steps formulated
by a computer programmer, and not the basic functionality, creative concepts,
or philosophy of the program, the line between expression and function, con-
cept, or philosophy is fuzzy at best. Over the years, the courts have developed
a series of guidelines to aid in determining the breadth of a copyright, in other
words, the extent to which the copyright protects more than the expression
of an idea.23 These guidelines are not always useful in analyzing copyright
protection of computer programs.24 With some exceptions, a work that retains
the basic character of another work constitutes copyright infringement of the
original, even though modified." Nonetheless, the breadth of copyright pro-
tection is substantially narrower than that of patent protection.
The reach of copyright protection is also limited. A copyright is effective
only against "copiers," or those acting in concert with them. 26 Any indepen-
dent creation of a program, even if it both incorporates the concept or idea
of a copyrighted program and uses a similar series of instructional steps, is
not copyright infringement. Therefore, anyone who wishes to independently
program the concept or idea of a copyrighted program can do so without
constraint from the copyright laws. 27 If the program is sufficiently commer-
cially important, and has a life expectancy long enough to permit one to
independently write a similar program, the concepts and ideas of the copyright
owner may be appropriated by others with impunity. This occurs frequently
22. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102-03 (1880); see 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982).
23. See, e.g., Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1980) (copyright
in collective work covers only original aspects of collection and not pre-existing work upon which
collection is based).
24. For example, the video display created by a computer program may also be copyrighted
as an audio-visual work. A copyrighted audio-visual work should be defined in terms of the
image or images created by the program steps and not the program steps per se. Nonetheless,
the principle that it is the manner of expression (the image or images in the above example),
which is protected and not the concept or idea, still applies. See Williams Electronics, Inc. v.
Artic Int'l., Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 874-75 (3d Cir. 1982); Stern Electronics, Inc. v. Kaufman,
669 F.2d 852, 885 (2d Cir. 1982); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l., Inc., 547 F. Supp. 999, 1008-09
(N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, __ U.S. , 104 S. Ct.
90 (1983); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466, 479, 483 (D. Neb. 1981).
25. See Structural Dynamics Research Corp. v. Engineering Mechanics Research Corp.,
401 F. Supp. 1102 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
26. See Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artic Int'l., Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 876 (3d Cir. 1982);
Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963); DeAcosta v.
Brown, 146 F.2d 408, 410-11 (2d Cir. 1944); 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1982).
27. See Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., Inc., 462 F. Supp. 1003,




in the software industry and has led to the proliferation of programs using
similar concepts. For example, spreadsheet, database, graphics, and word
processing programs often use similar screen formats, menus and commands,
although each may employ an independently generated series of program
instructions.
In summary, the copyright laws permit the appropriation of the idea or
concept of a copyrighted program, but not the copying of its manner of
expression. Although copyrights have these limitations, they still constitute
valuable protection, especially with respect to short-lived programs. Copyrights
are acquired and registered at nominal cost. Most importantly, in many
copyright cases preliminary injunctions are available.28 The quick relief pro-
vided by copyright action stands in stark contrast to the agonizingly slow relief
provided by patents. A copyright prevents the copier from taking a "free ride"
at the expense of the originator of the copyrighted program. In regard to
copyright protection, the price of admission to the market is the cost in time
and money required to independently create a program.
C. Trade Secrets
Trade secret enforcement is most commonly used to prevent a disloyal
employee from appropriating the novel work product of his employer, if that
work product has been kept duly secret.2 9 In the programming context, an
employee is not permitted to take a "non-public ' 30 program for his own use.
While the courts would likely excuse the independent generation of a program
accomplished wholly after an employee left his former employer, the indepen-
dent generation of a program will not always be a defense to a cause of action
for theft of trade secrets. For example, if the independent generation of a
28. See Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Electronics Corp., 672 F.2d 607,
620-21 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); American Metropolitan Enterprises of N.Y.
v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 389 F.2d 903, 905 (2d Cir. 1968).
29. See R. MiLcRim, 12 Busmss ORGANIZATIONS-TRADE SECRETS § 2.01, at 214 (1984).
The Restatement of Torts defines a trade secret as:
any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one's
business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors
who do not know or use it....
The subject matter of a trade secret must be secret ... so that, except by the
use of improper means, there would be difficulty in acquiring the information.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939).
30. The issue of whether a program is "non-public" must be examined closely. For example,
machine code may be released to customers in the form of magnetically-encoded media, while
source code is zealously kept secret. Thus, the source code may be a trade secret notwithstanding
the release of the machine code. Generally, a feature of a program which is not discernible from
the product upon a reasonable effort to discover it can be retained as a trade secret, even though
the product has been released to the public. University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown
Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 534 (5th Cir. 1974); Com-Share, Inc. v. Computer Complex, Inc., 338
F. Supp. 1229, 1239 (E.D. Mich. 1971), aff'd, 458 F.2d 1341 (6th Cir. 1972); Cybertek Computer
Products, Inc. v. Whitfield, 203 U.S.P.Q. 1020, 1024 (Cal. 1977).
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program benefitted from trade secret information relating to program con-
cepts, a court might nonetheless find a theft of the trade secret." To the
extent that the courts recognize this, trade secret protection will be broader
in scope than copyright protection, but substantially narrower than patent pro-
tection. Additionally, unlike patent protection, trade secret protection is
fleeting. Once the program is made "public," or independently developed and
disclosed, trade secret protection is lost. 2 On the other hand, neither copyright
protection nor patent protection is lost upon publication of the program. Even
in those cases in which the trade secret was not lost by publication, some
courts have limited the period of effective trade secret protection by limiting
the length of an injunction against a trade secret misappropriator to the "head-
start" period afforded by the misappropriation. 3 Some commentators con-
tend that trade secret protection and copyright protection are serial, in other
words, that trade secret protection is available until publication, while copyright
protection is created upon publication even if the infringement is inadvertent.
3 4
Even more certainly, trade secret protection may precede patent protection,
a concept long recognized in non-software cases."
Trade secret protection reaches no further than to those persons receiving
secrets as a result of a breach of a contractual or fiduciary relationship with
the trade secret owner. 36 Accordingly, trade secret protection will most often
affect disloyal employees and those in privity with them. Copyright infringe-
ment requires no such relationship, but rather merely requires copying. Patent
infringement requires neither a relationship of privity nor copying, for patent
protection reaches even unknowing independent developers, an important
advantage over trade secret and copyright protection. In summary, trade secret
31. The use of the owner's program concepts, even in the development of the subsequent
program, provides an unfair competitive advantage to the wrongful acquirer, for it deprives the
owner of his headstart. See Molinaro v. Burnbaum, 201 U.S.P.Q. 150, 163 (D. Mass. 1978).
32. See Struthers Scientific & Int'l Corp. v. Rappl & Hoenig Co., 453 F.2d 250, 254-55
(2d Cir. 1972); Republic Systems & Programming, Inc. v. Computer Assistance, Inc., 322 F.
Supp. 619, 628 (D. Conn. 1970), aff'd, 440 F.2d 996 (2d Cir. 1971); Sinclair v. Aquarius Elec-
tronics, Inc., 42 Cal. App. 3d 216, 116 Cal. Rptr. 654 (1974).
33. See Anaconda Co. v. Metric Tool & Die Co., 485 F. Supp. 410, 430-31 (E.D. Pa.
1980); Data General Corp. v. Digital Computer Controls, Inc., 297 A.2d 433, 436 (Del. Ch.
1971), aff'd, 297 A.2d 437 (Del. 1972). Unlike a patent, which provides protection for the inven-
tion for the period of time for which it is granted, the protection afforded by a trade secret
lasts only as long as competitors fail to duplicate it through legitimate, independent research.
See University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 534 (5th Cir. 1974).
34. Although copyright protection is created upon publication, such protection may also
have existed previously on the software as an unpublished work. The argument that trade secret
protection is not destroyed by affixing a copyright notice to an unpublished work is controver-
sial. See Technicon Medical Info. System v. Green Bay Packaging, Inc., 687 F.2d 1032, 1039
(7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1106 (1983); BPI Systems v. Leith, 532 F. Supp. 208,
210-11 (W.D. Tex. 1981); M. Bryce & Assoc. v. Gladstone, 107 Wis.2d 241, 256, 319 N.W.2d
907 (Wis. App.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 944 (1982).
35. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicon Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 487-88 (1974).
36. See Wexler v. Greenberg, 399 Pa. 569, 160 A.2d 430 (1960); By-Buk Co. v. Printed
Cellophane Tape Co., 163 Cal. App.2d 157, 166, 329 P.2d 147, 150 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958).
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protection, while of great importance, is quite restricted. It is limited in breadth
to only those programs which are in fact trade secrets, and limited in reach
to only those persons who either breached a fiduciary relationship with the
program owner or who are in privity with one who has breached such a
fiduciary relationship.
II. VALIDITY OF SoFTwARE RELATED PATENTS
A. Computer Programs as Statutory Subject Matter
Under Section 101 of the Patent Act-A Brief History
The patentability of computer programs has had a rather turbulent history.
Various elements of the business and legal communities have come down on
opposite sides of the issue. On the one hand, the Patent Office, 37 the 1966 Presi-
dent's Commission on the Patent System,3 8 as well as IBM, Burroughs, and
Honeywell" argued that computer programs should not be patentable. The Pa-
tent Office in Gottschalk v. Benson"° and Parker v. Flook,4' for example, argued
that it was not well equipped to examine patent applications relating to com-
puter programs. On the other hand, the Patent Bar, 2 soon followed by an emerg-
ing software industry, urged that computer programs be treated like any other
new technology, and hence be deemed patentable if the requirements for in-
vention were met.4 3 The battle was initially fought in the Patent Office and in
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) with the Patent Office con-
sistently rejecting patent applications on computer programs and the CCPA,
almost equally consistently, reversing the Patent Office's decisions."
The Supreme Court eventually addressed the issue in Gottschalk v.
Benson,45 a case which in the opinion of many, merely muddied the waters.
37. See, e.g., 829 OFF. GAz. PAT. OFc. 865 (Aug. 16, 1966); Brief of Petitioner, Gottschalk
v. Benson, 34 L.Ed.2d 744 (1972).
38. See Report of President's Commission on the Patent System, To Promote the Progress
of Useful Arts (G.P.O. 1966).
39. See Briefs of Amicus Curiae, Benson, 34 L.Ed.2d at 745-46 (urging reversal).
40. 409 U.S. 63, 72 (1972).
41. 437 U.S. 584, 587 (1978). Surely, the Patent Office must have found it slightly embar-
rassing to assert that it, the government organization having the premiere responsibility for fostering
new technologies, was itself incapable of dealing with a new technology. In practice, the Patent
Office has shown itself well-qualified to examine applications on computer programs.
42. See Briefs of American Patent Law Association and Patent Law Association of Chicago,
Benson, 34 L.Ed.2d at 746 (urging affirmance).
43. See e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 217 n. 42 (1981).
44. See In re Waldbaum, 457 F.2d 997, 1003 (C.C.P.A. 1972), aff'd, 559 F.2d 611 (C.C.P.A.
1977); In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 893 (C.C.P.A. 1970); In re Mahony, 421 F.2d 742, 746-47
(C.C.P.A. 1970); In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395, 1403 (C.C.P.A. 1969); In re Prater, 415 F.2d
1393, 1405-06 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (Prater II); In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1378, 1389 (C.C.P.A. 1968)
(Prater I); In re Naquin, 398 F.2d 863, 866 (C.C.P.A. 1968); Ex parte Jensen, 163 U.S.P.Q.
117, 118 (P.O. Bd. App. 1968); see also Kayton, Patent Protectability of Software: Background
and Current Law, Law of Software 1968 Proceedings, B-25, reprinted in 9 JtimnEnucs J., 127
(Mar. 1969).
45. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
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In Benson, the Supreme Court held unpatentable a computer program for
converting binary-coded decimal numerals to binary numerals, 46 but declined
to foreclose completely the patentability of computer programs. The Supreme
Court's decision in Benson was founded on the belief that the method claims
at issue wholly preempted the "mathematical algorithm" by which the binary-
coded decimal-to-binary conversion was effected. 7 The Patent Office, not unex-
pectedly, believed that the Benson decision closed the issue of the patentability
of computer programs." The CCPA on the other hand, in In re Johnston
49
defined an "apparatus" exception to Benson by characterizing that decision
as involving only whether a series of mathematical calculations can be a paten-
table "process," not an "apparatus."5 0
The Patent Office was successful in obtaining Supreme Court review of
In re Johnston, a case which squarely presented the patentability issue."
Unfortunately the Supreme Court in In re Johnston declined to rule on the
patentability issue and decided the case on a routine "obviousness" finding.2
After Johnston, the CCPA continued to develop exceptions to the Benson
decision. 3 In Parker v. Flook 4 the Supreme Court again rejected an applica-
tion to patent a computer program. 5 Justice Stevens, writing for the majority
in Flook, held that the patent application as a whole contained no patentable
invention.5 6 The effect of the Flook decision was to temper, although not halt,
the CCPA's attempts to expand the exceptions to Benson. Consequently, Flook
did little, if anything, to settle the issue of whether computer programs were
patentable, as illustrated by the continuing controversy between the Patent
Office and the CCPA on this matter.
Notwithstanding Flook, the CCPA continued to find patentable subject
matter in computer program inventions, 7 albeit at a decreasing rate, to the
delight of a substantial portion of the Patent Bar. Clearly, however, the CCPA
46. See id. at 71-73.
47. See id. at 71.
48. See Brief of Petitioner, Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 47 L.Ed.2d 969, 970 (1976).
49. 502 F.2d 765 (C.C.P.A. 1974), rev'd sub. nom., Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976).
The device in Johnston was a record keeping machine for banking transactions. Id.
50. See id. at 771.
51. See In re Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976).
52. See id. at 225.
53. See In re Toma, 575 F.2d 872, 877-78 (C.C.P.A. 1978); In re Freeman,, 573 F.2d 1237,
1245-46 (C.C.P.A. 1978); In re Deutsch, 553 F.2d 689, 692-93 (C.C.P.A. 1977); In re Chatfield,
545 F.2d 152, 158 (C.C.P.A.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977); In re Noll, 545 F.2d 141, 148-49
(C.C.P.A. 1976).
54. 437 U.S. 584 (1978). The patent in Flook related to a computer program which set
alarm limits for control of a chemical process. See id. at 585.
55. See id. at 596.
56. Id. at 594 (Supreme Court found that respondent's application contained no claim of
patentable invention).
57. See In re Sherwood, 613 F.2d 809, 817-18 (C.C.P.A.), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 994 (1980);
In re Bradley and Franklin, 600 F.2d 807, 811 (C.C.P.A. 1979), affd per curiam, 450 U.S. 381
(1980); In re Diehr and Lutton, 602 F.2d 982 (C.C.P.A. 1979), aff'd sub. nom., Diamond v.
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1980); In re Johnson, 589 F.2d 1070 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
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respected the opinions of the Supreme Court; in fact, the CCPA felt constrained
by its obligation to follow superior authority in defining patentable subject
matter relating to computer programs . 5 For that reason, throughout this period
the CCPA found it necessary to reject a number of computer program inven-
tions which, but for Benson and Flook, may have been accepted as patentable
subject matter under section 101 of the Patent Act (the Act). 9 During the
post-Benson and post-Flook period, the frustration of the Patent Office can
well be imagined. Notwithstanding its perception of Benson and Flook as
significant victories in the Supreme Court, the Patent Office was nonetheless
forced to receive and examine patent applications for computer programs.
The first real encouragement provided by the Supreme Court to proponents
of the patentability of computer programs came in the Court's decisions in
Diamond v. Diehr6° and Diamond v. Bradley.6' In Diehr, the Supreme Court
held by a one vote majority that a computer controlled rubber molding process
was patentable subject matter.62 In Bradley, an equally divided Supreme Court
affirmed a CCPA holding to the effect that a CPU firmware module for con-
trolling a computer in a multi-programming mode was patentable subject
matter. 63 The Diehr and Bradley decisions effectively allowed the CCPA to
continue its efforts to define patentable subject matter in computer program
related inventions.
B. Computer Programs as Statutory Subject Matter Under
Section 101 of the Act-The Current Test
An understanding of the issue of the patentability of computer programs
as it exists today can be obtained by considering the decisions of the CCPA
58. Cf. In re Sherwood, 613 F.2d 809, 812 (C.C.P.A. 1980) "[The] [a]pplicant's assertion
that the Benson decision upholds the patentability of the presently claimed invention fails to
take into consideration the entire opinion as presented by -Mr. Justice Douglas." Id.
59. See In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 769 (C.C.P.A. 1980); In re Gelnovatch, 595 F.2d 32,
41-42 (C.C.P.A. 1979); In re Castelet, 652 F.2d 1236, 1243-44 (C.C.P.A. 1977); In re Richman,
563 F.2d 1026 (C.C.P.A. 1977); In re Christensen, 478 F.2d 1392, 1394 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
60. 450 U.S. 175 (1981). The patent at issue in Diamond v. Diehr related to a computer-
controlled rubber molding process by which the temperature in a mold was continuously monitored,
a known rubber cure-time formula was repetitively recalculated using the monitored mold
temperature, and the mold was opened automatically when the calculated cure time and the actual
cure time were equal. See id. at 178-79. The Diehr majority held that the process was patentable,
notwithstanding the fact that it provided for the computer implementation of a mathematical
algorithm, because the process was effective to "transform and reduce an article to a different
state or thing." Id. at 192.
61. 450 U.S. 381 (1981). Bradley involved a CPU firmware module which was programmed
to direct system data base transfers between the main memory of the computer and scratchpad
registers to more efficiently control the operation of the computer in a multi-programming mode.
See In re Bradley, 600 F.2d 807, 808-09 (C.C.P.A. 1979), aff'd per curim, 450 U.S. 381 (1980).
The C.C.P.A. held that the applicants were claiming a combination of hardware elements which
allowed the computer to alter stored information in a new way, and not the firmware per se.
Id. at 812. The C.C.P.A. did not find the presence of any mathematical algorithm, even though
the firmware caused elemental calculations, and held the invention patentable. Id. at 813. The
Supreme Court affirmed the C.C.P.A.'s holding per curiam. See 450 U.S. at 381.
62. See 450 U.S. at 191-93.
63. See 450 U.S. at 381.
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and its successor court, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC),
which follow Diehr and Bradley. Of particular interest is the CCPA's two-
part test for defining patentable subject matter under section 101 of the Act."
Under the CCPA test, which is now applicable as binding precedent on the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in view of South Corp. v. United
States,6 - a claim is patentable if either of the following conditions are met:
(1) the claim does not directly or indirectly recite a "mathematical
algorithm"; or
(2) although the claim involves a "mathematical algorithm," the
claim contains additional recitations which apply the algorithm to
physical elements (of an apparatus claim) or process steps (of a method
claim), and the claim therefore does not wholly preempt the
algorithm.
66
Thus, the first consideration in evaluating any patent involving a com-
puter program is whether the patent claims include within their scope a
mathematical algorithm. Importantly, not every algorithm raises a statutory
subject matter question. Although the term "algorithm" is broad, and almost
any process or series of logical steps can be characterized as an algorithm,
the courts to date have been concerned primarily with essentially mathematical
algorithms or formulas. For example, in Benson, the Supreme Court defined
the term "algorithm" as a "procedure for solving a given type of mathematical
problem."'61
Examples of claimed subject matter of patent applications that include
mathematical algorithms are: (1) the binary-coded-decimal to binary conver-
sion process of Benson;61 (2) the quadratic equation for computing the porosity
of subsurface formations in In re Christensen;69 (3) the method of calculating
the number of busy and idle lines in the telephone system in In re Waldbaum;"
(4) the mathematical formula for calculating airborne radar bore sight correc-
tion angles in In re Richman;7 ' the method of calculating alarm limits for
controlling a parameter of a catalytic hydrocarbon conversion process in Parker
v. Flook ;72 (6) a CAT scan imaging technique using a calculation for reducing
the exposure of the body to radiation in In re Abele;13 and (7) the rubber
cure time formula in Diehr."
4
64. The two-part test was first set forth in In re Freeman. See In re Freeman, 573 F.2d
1237, 1245-46 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
65. 690 F.2d 1368 (C.A.F.C. 1982).
66. See In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1273, 1245 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
67. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 65 (1972).
68. See id.
69. See In re Christensen, 478 F.2d 1392 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
70. See In re Waldbaum, 559 F.2d 611 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
71. See In re Richman, 563 F.2d 1026 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
72. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 484 (1978).
73. See In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
74. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
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Examples of a series of logical steps which are not mathematical algorithms
are: (1) the method for processing text and graphical information for display
on a cathode ray tube in In re Noll;15 (2) the method of operating a multi-
programming computer system involving the accumulation of data and deter-
mination of task priorities in In re Chatfield;"6 (3) the method for controlling
and optimizing the operation of oil refineries at different geographic loca-
tions in In re Deutsch;" (4) the digitally controlled electro-optical imaging
system for a television system in Hirschfeld v. Banner;78 (5) the method for
controlling the internal operation of a computer to convert the computer from
a sequential processor to a nonsequential processor in In re Pardo;" and
(6) the method for improving computer performance by using firmware to
direct data transfers between the main memory and the scratchpad registers
in Diamond v. Bradley.8"
The CCPA's two-step test originated in Benson, Freeman and In re
Walter,81 all of which were pre-Diehr cases. In Walter, the CCPA addressed
patent claims concerning a process for correlating and cross-correlating
signals.8 2 The preamble of the claim stated that such correlations were to be
used in connection with seismic surveying, but the body of the claim was not
so limited." The CCPA stated that if a mathematical algorithm is merely
presented and solved by the claimed invention, and is not applied in any man-
ner to the physical elements of an apparatus claim or to the process steps
of a method claim, neither a recitation of post-solution activity in the body
of the claim nor a preamble reciting the field of use of the mathematical
algorithm will save the claim." Because the Walter claims merely recited the
field of use of the mathematical algorithm in the preamble, they failed the
second part of the two-step analysis.8 5
The statement by the CCPA in Walter that "no amount of post-solution
activity will render the claim statutory' 86 should not be taken at face value.
In Walter, the CCPA stated that recitations which apply a mathematical
algorithm to physical elements of apparatus claims or to process steps of
method claims will save the claim.8 7 Yet, such redeeming physical elements
or process steps arguably relate to post-solution activity. Consequently, the
75. See In re Noll, 545 F.2d 141 (C.C.P.A. 1976).
76. See In re Chatfield 545 F.2d 152 (C.C.P.A. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977).
77. See In re Deutsch 553 F.2d 689 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
78. See Hirschfeld v. Banner, 462 F. Supp. 135 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd, 615 F.2d 1368 (D.C.
Civ. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 994 (1981).
79. See In re Pardo and Landau, 684 F.2d 912 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
80. See Diamond v. Bradley, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
81. 618 F.2d 758 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
82. See id. at 761.
83. Id. at 760-62.
84. Id. at 767.
85. See id. at 770.
86. Id. at 767.
87. See id.
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statement that a recitation of post-solution activity will not save the claim
should be read to mean that a naked recitation of post-solution activity which
does not properly apply the mathematical algorithm to physical elements of
a apparatus claim or to process steps of a method claim will not save the
claim. Proper recitation of the nexus between the algorithm and the post-
solution activity apparently will render the claim patentable.
The CCPA attempted to clarify this issued in In re Abele,"9 a post-Diehr
decision. The specific claims at issue in Abele concerned a method practiced
by a CAT scan machine which required, by reference to the specification,
the passing of an X-ray beam through an object, the detection of the beam
thereafter, the performance of an algorithm to modify the detected informa-
tion, and the display of the data in the required format. 9 The Abele claims
were made to a CAT scan imaging technique which used a mathematical
algorithm for calculating exposure times. 90 Because the Abele claims involved
a mathematical algorithm, the second part of the two-step analysis was directly
at issue. 9' The CCPA restated its conclusions from the Walter case, then
wrestled with the question of the quality required of the redeeming recitations
which apply the mathematical algorithm to physical elements or process steps. 9
The CCPA stated that:
... Walter should be read as requiring no more than that the algorithm
be 'applied in any manner to physical elements or process steps,' pro-
vided that its application is circumscribed by more than a field of
use limitation or non-essential post-solution activity. Thus, if the claim
would be 'otherwise statutory,' . . . albeit inoperative or less useful
without the algorithm, the claim likewise presents statutory subject
matter when the algorithm is included. This broad reading of Walter,
we conclude, is in accord with the Supreme Court decisions [including
Diehr] .93
The CCPA in Abele appeared to suggest that a relatively low threshold
requirement will be set for non-algorithmic recitations which apply a
mathematical algorithm to its end use. This is not to say that illusory or de
minimis recitations will redeem the claim. As illustrated by the statement in
Abele quoted above, the CCPA has indicated that a mere field of use limita-
tion (apparently regardless of its location in the claim) or a non-essential post-
solution activity will not save a claim. Claims 5 and 611 of Abele should be
88. See In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
89. See id. at 908.
90. See id. at 908.
91. See id. at 909.
92. See id. at 906-07.
93. Id. at 907.
94. Claim 5 in Abele recited the method there at issue:
5. A method of displaying data in a field comprising the steps of calculating the
difference between the local value of the data at a data point in the field and the average
value of the data in a region of the field which surrounds said point for each point
in said field, and displaying the value of said difference as a signed gray scale at a
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compared since they delineate the "good" and "bad" of the novel method
which embodied the algorithm, but failed the statutory subject matter test
because it lacked the recitations which applied the algorithm to a particular
process. 95 Claim 6, which merely added the familiar CAT scan machine
environment with its data gathering capability, passed without close analysis
by the court.
9 6
In its analysis of Claim 6 the Abele court placed heavy reliance on the
inclusion of X-ray attenuation data. The court observed that "data is available
only when an X-ray beam is produced by a CAT scanner, I asses through an
object, and detected upon its exit." 97 The Abele court then analyzed the claim
absent the algorithm. It viewed the X-ray production, detection, and data
display steps as manifestly statutory subject matter, notwithstanding the
presence of a mathematical algorithm in the claimed method.9 The court con-
cluded that the claim presented data-gathering steps which did not follow from
the presence of the algorithm, but rather from other limitations in the claims
which required the data.99 Thus, the Abele court did not view the non-
algorithmic steps in the claim as being merely antecedent to obtain informa-
tion for solving the algorithm. Because the pre-solution activity and the pro-
duction and detection of X-rays were more than the mere antecedent steps
to obtain values for solving the algorithm, the court found Claim 6
patentable. °0 It is clear from the cases discussed above that the CCPA is not
reluctant to search out the limitations which connect an otherwise unpatent-
able algorithm to redeeming process steps to save a patent. In keeping with
its historical viewpoint, the CCPA appears not to be looking for reasons to
invalidate computer program claims, but rather for supportable reasons to
uphold those claims.
Abele should be compared to the decision in In re Taner,'" a case decided
two months earlier yet also after Diehr. In Taner, the CCPA had before it
a claim to a method of seismic exploration by which substantially plane or
substantially cylindrical seismic energy waves are simulated from the
predominantly spherical seismic waves imparted to the earth by an explosion. 2
The claim called for three steps: (1) imparting spherical seismic energy waves
into the earth, for example, by an explosion; (2) generating reflection signals
point in a picture which corresponds to said data point.
Id. at 908.
Claim 6 of Abele added the CAT environment to the method recited in Claim 5:
6. The method of Claim 5 wherein said data is X-ray attenuation data produced




97. Id. at 908-09.
98. See id. at 908.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. 681 F.2d 787 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
102. See id. at 787.
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at receivers in a spaced array; and (3) summing the reflection signals to simulate
the reflection response of a plane or substantially cylindrical seismic wave,
the mathematical algorithm. 0 3 No display or other utilization of the data was
claimed.'0 " As a result of the absence of a utilization recitation, a more ex-
pansive view of permissive subject matter was required in Taner than was re-
quired of the CAT scan method in Abele, which did claim display of the data
in a certain format. In Taner, the Patent and Trademark Office Board of
Appeals characterized the summing step as a mathematical algorithm.' 5 The
CCPA, however, found that the claims were statutory, emphasizing that the
seismic signals obtained in a conventional way were converted into another
form, in other words, a form representing plane or cylindrical waves. 6 The
CCPA in Taner did not appear to rest its position on the steps of imparting
seismic waves into the earth or receiving reflections of the seismic waves, but
rather, on the fact that a Diehr-type transformation had occurred, that is,
the transformation or reduction of an article into a different state or thing.''0
Because the CCPA did not rely on the imparting or receiving steps, Taner
may be read broadly as stating that an algorithm which causes the conversion
of a signal from one form to another constitutes statutory subject matter.
The Taner decision preceded the Abele and Pardo decisions, and did not
rest upon the Freeman!Walter two-part test, but rather upon the Diehr
"transformation" test. While it may be that the Taner decision is merely an
initial response to the Diehr decision, that is, an attempt by the CCPA to
conform its holding to the literal language of Diehr, Taner may also con-
stitute more than an interim stage in the development of the philosophy of
the CCPA in computer program cases. In fact, Taner may be broadly read
to establish a second, independent statutory test which, if passed, renders a
claim statutory without regard for the outcome of the Freeman! Walter test.
Of course, the Taner seismic exploration method arguably also may have passed
the Freeman! Walter test, albeit by a closer margin, had the CCPA applied
it. Nonetheless, it will be interesting to see if in its future opinions the CAFC
develops the "transformation" test of Taner.
The last CCPA computer program decision issued before the CCPA was
abolished, In re Meyer and Weissman,108 concerned a method and apparatus
for assisting a neurologist in examining and diagnosing a patient.'°9 The claims
recited a series of steps which corresponded to the mental processes that a
neurologist would follow during the diagnosis of a patient."0 Although it is
questionable whether the Meyer steps amounted to a mathematical algorithm,
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. Id. at 790.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 791.
108. 688 F.2d 789, (C.C.P.A. 1982).
109. See id. at 791.
110. See id. at 795.
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the applicants admitted at oral argument that the steps were a mathematical
algorithm." The CCPA, quite naturally, relied upon the applicants' admis-
sion and proceeded immediately to the second part of the two-part test of
Freeman, Walter, Pardo and Abele to determine whether the claim contained
the additional redeeming recitations."' Finding none, the court held that the
claims were non-statutory." 3 Unfortunately, little can be learned from the
Meyer case because the admission by the applicants that a mathematical
algorithm was claimed foreclosed a thorough consideration of the issue. The
claimed subject matter in Meyer appeared to be no more than a neurologist's
handbook stored in a computer.I" It would have been helpful, from the stand-
point of the development of the law, if the CCPA had considered whether
a program containing such information preempted non-statutory subject mat-
ter, such as the rules or principles of neurological medicine.
There has been little recent activity on the issue of whether computer pro-
grams are patentable under section 101 of the Act. The Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit has provided no direct guidance on this issue. The
Federal District Court for the District of Delaware, however, recently con-
sidered the issue in Paine, Webber, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Inc." 5 The patent
claim in Paine, Webber concerned a data processing method and apparatus
for operating a "Securities Brokerage-Cash Management System.""' 6 Paine,
Webber, seeking a summary judgment to invalidate the patent, argued that
the claims defined nothing more than a combination of familiar business
systems, including margin brokerage accounts, money market funds, and check-
ing/charge accounts, and maintained that a valid patent cannot exist on claims
directed to a computer program that merely implements such business
systems. " The Paine, Webber court struggled with the definition of the crucial
term "algorithm" and the issue of whether that term was applicable to the
patented cash management system. "I Bowing to authority' 19, the court decided
that "algorithm" means a "procedure for solving a given type of mathematical
problem,"'' and held that:
[u]sing this definition, this Court has carefully examined the claims
in this case and is unable to find any direct or indirect recitation of
111. See id.
112. See id. at 796.
113. See id.
114. See id. at 793.
115. 564 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Del. 1983).
116. See id. at 1364.
117. See id. at 1365. Paine, Webber apparently believed that a "business system" is the
equivalent of a "mathematical algorithm", even though there may be little mathematics involved
in the business system. See id. at 1365. A "business system," whether or not it includes algorithms,
has traditionally been viewed as unpatentable subject matter. See Hotel Security Checking Co.
v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467 (2d Cir. 1908).
118. See 564 F. Supp. at 1366-68.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 45-47 (Benson).
120. See 564 F. Supp. at 1368.
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a procedure for solving a mathematical problem. Rather, the patent
allegedly claims a methodology to effectuate a highly efficient business
system and does not restate a mathematical formula as defined by
Benson. Nor are any of the recited steps in the claims mere procedure
for solving mathematical problems. Accordingly, the claims do not
recite or preempt an algorithm.' 2 '
As to the defendant's contention that the patented program defined nothing
more than familiar business systems, the Paine, Webber court held that if no
Benson-type algorithm existed, the fact that the computer program effectuated
a business activity was irrelevant.'"2
If not there already, the courts are clearly moving toward the position that
computer programs are statutory subject matter under section 101 of the Act.
In view of the CAFC's exclusive appellate jurisdiction over patent cases
throughout the United States, this trend will probably continue absent further
intervention by the Supreme Court.
C. Nonobviousness Under Section 103 of the Act
Consideration of novelty under section 102 of the Act is not discussed
herein because the application of the novelty standard to computer program
inventions is guided by conventional principles and presents few unique
problems in the computer program area. The question of obviousness under
section 103, however, is another matter. It was suggested above that on prac-
tical grounds, claims directed to broad "concepts" are the best candidates
for enforcement through patent litigation. It is also suggested that "concept"
inventions probably have a greater chance of surviving the obviousness test
during litigation than claims directed to the specific manner by which a pro-
gram is implemented or carried out. This conclusion is founded on the obser-
vation that the typical implementation of a computer program represents the
height of logical thinking. Traditionally, it has been difficult to separate in
the course of patent litigation that which is logical from that which is obvious
and therefore not patentable. More often than not, the courts have equated
logical subject matter with obvious subject matter, even though the two are
not necessarily related. For example, Einstein's famous equation E = mc2 is
logical, but comprehension of the derivation of the equation was beyond most
physicists when the equation was first made known.
In a typical computer program, each step of the program is an expression
of precise meaning. Each step is logically related to other steps in the pro-
gram, with the constraints of the process defining narrow corridors through
which the programmer must pass. At this level an argument that specific pro-
gramming steps are obvious is thus easily made and will likely be sustained.
This is not to say that some claims which are directed to specific programm-
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1369.
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ing steps, as opposed to "concepts," will not be found to pass the nonob-
viousness test, but only that each such patent claim will probably face a long
and difficult struggle for patentability. Ironically, the clever manipulations
by which the plaintiff in Benson converted binary-coded decimal to binary
code could probably survive the nonobviousness analysis under section 103.
Under section 103 of the Act, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in
Graham v. John Deere,'23 a claimed invention is not patentable if the dif-
ference between the claimed subject matter and the prior art is such that the
subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time that the inven-
tion was made "to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
subject matter pertains." 24 There are, however, many examples of inventions
in non-computer fields that are implemented in part by a computer program,
such as the rubber molding process in Diamond v. Diehr,'2 5 the bore sight
correction process in In re Richman, 2 6 the seismic exploration processes in
In re Christensen'21 and In re Taner,'2" and the petrochemical control process
in In re Deutsch.'"9 In those cases, is the person of ordinary skill as defined
in section 103 a computer programmer or a person skilled in the relevant non-
computer art? More ominously for the patent owner, should the court com-
bine a computer programmer and a person skilled in the relevant non-computer
art? The Second Circuit decision in Digitronics Corp. v. New York Racing
Ass'n.,'" suggests that different disciplines can be combined in determining
the obviousness of an invention under section 103. That case involved a betting
totalizer for a parimutal betting system.' 3 ' The prior art totalizers were com-
plex mechanical machines. 2 2 The invention at issue in Digitronics utilized a
programmed digital computer to accomplish the functions of the prior
mechanical totalizers. ' The patent owner argued that those skilled in the
totalizer art were not skilled computer programmers, and hence, the level of
skill of a computer programmer was inapplicable to an analysis of whether
the invention was obvious. 3 The district court disagreed, and considered the
expertise of a computer programmer relevant to the obviousness analysis.' 3
The district court found the invention obvious and thus ineligible for patent
protection, a holding the Second Court affirmed on appeal.
36
123. Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1. (1966).
124. See 35 U.S.C. § 103; 383 U.S. at 17.
125. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
126. See In re Richman, 563 F.2d 1026 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
127. See In re Christensen, 478 F.2d 1392 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
128. See In re Taner, 681 F.2d 787 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
129. See In re Deutsch, 553 F.2d 689 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
130. 553 F.2d 740 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 860 (1977).
131. See id. at 741.
132. See id. at 746.
133. See id. at 747.
134. See id. at 744.
135. See id. at 745.
136. See id. at 749.
1984] 1325
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1307
While bverturning a Patent Office rejection based on the failure to pro-
vide an enabling disclosure as required under section 112, the CCPA in In
re Naquin' I may have inadvertently assisted those who wish to combine distinct
technical disciplines to invalidate computer program patents as obvious under
section 103. In Naquin,'3 s the Patent Office rejected a patent claim for a method
of underground seismic exploration, asserting that the specification did not
disclose the claimed invention as required by section 112 because the specifica-
tion failed to disclose any computer program necessary to implement the
process. 139 The Patent Office's position was that "while one skilled in the
computer programming art may perform the method, one skilled in the seismic
prospecting art cannot."' 0 The CCPA rejected the Patent Office's conten-
tion, holding that if an invention involves two distinct arts, the specification
in a patent application concerning that invention is adequate if the specifica-
tion enables those proficient in each art to be able to implement those aspects
of the invention appropriate to their respective arts.''
Can the Naquin logic be applied to the analysis of nonobviousness required
by section 103? Where claimed subject matter involves discreet computer and
non-computer arts, is it a combination of the adept of each art that deter-
mines who is the "person of ordinary skill?" Because "person" is written
in the singular in section 103, the argument can be made that the language
of the statute prohibits the combination of persons of different arts. On the
other hand, a contrary argument can be made that the person skilled in the
non-computer art would rely upon the person skilled in the computer art to
carry out the programming, thereby effectively combining the skills of the
non-computer and computer persons in a single person.
The Supreme Court's analysis of whether computer programs are patent-
able under section 103 has proven unsatisfactory to date. In Dann v. Johnston,"2
the Supreme Court considered a patent claim to a record keeping machine for
bank checks and deposits that provided customers with statements containing
certain unique information.'4 3 The Supreme Court ignored the question of
whether the record keeping machine constituted statutory subject matter under
section 101 of the Act, and found the claimed subject matter to be obvious under
section 103 because it was similar to data processing systems in widespread use
in the banking industry.'44
D. Compliance with the Disclosure
Requirements of Section 112 of the Act
The leading case concerning the sufficiency of disclosure of computer-
137. 398 F.2d 863 (C.C.P.A. 1968).
138 Id.
139. See id. at 866.
140. Id.
141. See id.
142. 425 U.S. 219 (1976).
143. See id. at 221.
144. See id. at 229.
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related inventions under section 112 is In re Sherwood., 5 The invention at
issue in Sherwood involved a geophysical prospecting apparatus which used
data from a plurality of seismic wave receivers and computed a cross-sectional
map depicting the position and shape of subsurface formations.'4 6 The specifica-
tion was directed primarily to an analog computer apparatus suitable for pro-
ducing the desired subsurface map.' 47 Intending presumably to disclose the
"best mode," the applicant stated that "[the best mode contemplated by the
inventor of carrying out the invention is to perform the processing steps of
the invention on a large-scale digital computer with the processed data imprinted
into visible form on any one of the presently-available plotting devices."'" 8
The application did not contain a disclosure of the digital computer or its
program.' 49
Pursuant to section 112, the Patent Office rejected the applicant's claims
on the ground that they were based upon an inadequate disclosure, contend-
ing that the best mode had not been described in sufficient detail.' The
applicant in Sherwood had admitted that a working computer program existed
as of the filing date of the application, and therefore he had much more infor-
mation in his possession concerning the best mode than was presented in the
specification.'"' Relying on affidavits from experts submitted to establish the
ease with which the teachings of the specification could be converted into a
computer program, the CCPA found the "disclosure not so poor as to result
in concealment of the best mode."' 5 2 The CCPA reasoned that:
[I]n general, writing a computer program may be a task requiring the
most sublime of the inventive faculty or it may require only the dron-
ing use of a clerical skill. The difference between the two extremes
lies in the creation of mathematical methodology to bridge the gap
between the information one starts with (the "input") and the infor-
mation that is desired (the "output"). If these bridge-gapping tools
are disclosed, there would seem to be no cogent reason to require
disclosure to the menial tools known to all who practice this art.'1"
Another case involving the sufficiency of disclosure under section 112 is
White Consolidated Industries v. Vega Servo-Control, Inc.'14 In White the
patentee deliberately omitted from a patent application concerning a computer
operated machine tool the proprietary computer program of his employer. 1
145. 613 F.2d 809 (C.C.P.A. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 994 (1981).
146. Id. at 811-12.
147. See id. at 812.
148. Id.
149. See id.
150. Id. Section 112 of the Act requires the patent application to "set forth the best mode
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention." 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1982).
151. See 613 F.2d at 816-17.
152. Id. at 817.
153. Id. at 816-17.
154. 713 F.2d 788 (C.A.F.C. 1983), aff'g 214 U.S.P.Q. 796 (S.D. Mich. 1982).
155. See id. at 790.
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The patentee suggested in the patent application that his employer's proprietary
program, available at a price, could be used.'5 6 The patentee's employer main-
tained the program as a trade secret and had been licensing its use.' 5 7 Clearly,
the patentee was attempting to "have his cake and eat it too" by seeking to
protect the program after the patent issued under the trade secret laws (which
require secrecy) and under the patent laws (which require public disclosure
in the patent). The CAFC affirmed the district court's holding that the patent
was invalid for failure to comply with the enablement requirement of section
112.158 Although the result in White was harsh, the facts of the case are unusual
in view of the patentee's intentional concealment of the best mode of carrying
out his invention. At most, the White decision serves only as an exception
to the general rule stated in the Sherwood case.
While White provides a grim reminder to those who do not wish to be
forthcoming in their patent disclosures, the general rule, as expressed in
Sherwood, is that failure to disclose the computer program in a patent specifica-
tion is not fatal, as long as the patent contains sufficient information, nar-
rative or otherwise, to enable a programmer of reasonable skill to implement
the invention without undue experimentation.' 5 9 Moreover, White does not
prohibit a patent owner from maintaining a computer program (properly
disclosed in a patent application) as a trade secret during the pre-issuance
pendency of a patent application.'60 Consequently, the program owner can
enjoy trade secret protection of the program during the two or three years
of Patent Office pendency, and upon allowance of the application, can either
choose to disclose the program to the public by issuing the patent protecting
the program, or otherwise choose to continue to maintain the program as a
trade secret by abandoning the application. The decision can be made in light
of the breadth of the claims allowed by the Patent Office. In that sense, both
trade secret protection for a limited term of two or three years and patent
protection for the following seventeen-year term are available to the program
owner.
Notwithstanding the latitude of permissible disclosure provided by Sher-
wood, and with due regard for the difficulty of explaining complex subject
matter to a judge without technical expertise or a jury of laypersons, prudence
suggests disclosure in the patent application consisting of the following:
(1) a step-by-step narrative of the functions of the program in
terms which could be explained to a non-technical judge or a jury
of laypersons; and
(2) source code in a common computer language, preferably the
language of the best mode. Object code or machine language would
not appear to be necessary unless the invention related directly to it.
156. See White Consolidated Industries, 214 U.S.P.Q. at 824.
157. See id. at 823.
158. See 713 F.2d at 792.
159. See In re Sherwood, 613 F.2d at 817.
160. See 713 F.2d at 791.
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Such a disclosure will both facilitate an understanding of the subject matter
of the program on the part of the trier of fact at trial, and avoid completely
the necessity of litigating any sufficiency of disclosure issues under section 112.
III. INFRINGEMENT OF COMPUTER RELATED PATENTS
The patent infringement statute, 16, defines three categories of infringe-
ment. These are:
1. Direct Infringement by one who "makes, uses or sells any
patented invention."'
162
2. Contributory Infringement by one who "sells a component
of a patented machine ... or material or apparatus for use in practic-
ing a patented process, constituting a material part of the invention,
knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use
in an infringement of the patent, and not a staple article or commodity
of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use.... "163
3. Active Inducement of Infringement by one who "actively
induces infringement of a patent."'
164
The patents discussed above include the software with method claims at
issue in the Diehr case, and the software with machine claims at issue in the
Bradley case. The method or machine nature of the claims controls the
application of the infringement statute.165 With respect to direct infringement
of method claims, a method is practiced and therefore the patent infringed
when a computer operates under the control of the program to perform all
of the computational, processing and/or physical steps recited in any claim.
Performance of fewer than all of the steps of the method will avoid direct
infringement.' 66 With respect to direct infringement of machine claims, a
machine is made and therefore the patent infringed when a computer pro-
gram is loaded into the computer and configures the computer in accordance
with the structural recitations of the claims. An incomplete configuration will
avoid infringement. 1 ' In either case-method or machine-the computer pro-
gram must be loaded into the computer before a "direct" infringement oc-
curs. Standing alone, the existence of a computer program in the form of
a list of instructions, magnetic code on disk or tape, or in the form of solid
state devices, such as read-only memory, does not cause the method to be
performed or the machine to be constructed.
161. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1982).
162. Id. § 271(a).
163. Id. § 271(c).
164. Id. § 271(b).
165. The method or machine form of the claims, however, has no substantive effect on
the statutory subject matter issue. See Paine, Webber, 564 F. Supp. at 1366.
166. For a discussion of the elements of proof of direct infringement, see CmsUM, 4 PATENTS
§ 18.03[4], at 18-31 (1984).
167. Id.
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It is a simple matter to prove that a user of a patented program is a direct
infringer, although proving operation or reconfiguration of a machine under
the control of software may be more difficult. In Decca Ltd. v. United States' 8
a patent owner brought suit against the United States alleging patent infringe-
ment based upon the Government's use of an "Omega System," a very low
frequency radio navigation system used for ship and aircraft navigation.' 69
The patent claims were written in apparatus form, and included limitations
expressed mathematically concerning the phase relationships of signals broad-
cast from different stations.' 0 Although the Court of Claims found that the
patent claims read literally upon the Omega System,' 1I the Government argued
that it committed no infringement because its system employed neither the
same means nor achieved the same end result as did the plaintiff's device."'
The Government argued, inter alia, that it used a general purpose digital com-
puter while the plaintiff's patent relied upon an analog system, and that it
was the computer software that actually performed the calculations, which
constituted "nothing more than a set of equations."'
73
The Decca court found little credence in the Government's position. It
rejected the Government's argument that digital techniques avoided the analog
patent, observing that the claims were not so limited and that the specifica-
tion of the patent characterized the receiver in broad terms and was not limited
merely to analog embodiments. ' The Decca court also rejected the Govern-
ment's argument that the calculations performed by the software were mere
equations.' Although the Court of Claims characterized the Benson case as
holding computer programs unpatentable per se, it refused to construe the
claims as covering only computer software.'76 The court observed the other
aspects of the claims and found the Government liable, noting that the par-
ticular mathematical filters required by the software must be used in conjunc-
tion with a receiver, an apparatus for processing the signals received, as well
as with other apparatuses, all of which were tangible.'77
As regards most software, however, filing suit against each user of a pro-
gram is impractical. Therefore, a plaintiff may wish to enjoin the sale of the
program to stop present infringement, while also seeking compensation for
past infringement. The question this raises, however, is what are the bases
168. 544 F.2d 1070 (Ct. CI. 1976), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 819 (1981).
169. See id. at 1075.
170. See id. at 1079.
171. See id.
172. See id.
173. Id. at 1080.
174. Id. The applicant in Decca made no best mode argument, therefore the analog version
was presumably the best mode at the time the application was filed. See id. at 1077.
175. See id.
176. See id. Claim 1 in Decca included a first and a second station, each of which emitted
three signals in certain known relationship with the other, as well as a receiver which included
an apparatus for switching among the signals and providing information regarding the phase




upon which one may sue the seller of a program who sells the program to
others who subsequently directly infringe? Because a patented invention is not
made or used until the applicable computer program is loaded into the com-
puter, one who merely sells the program will usually not be a direct infringer.
Often, however, the seller of a program is also the developer of the program.
During the development of the program, there is likely to be use of the pro-
gram and hence, direct infringement.' 78 Moreover, the seller of a program
will often demonstrate and/or service the program. By conducting these
activities, the seller will render himself a direct infringer.
In situations in which no direct infringement has occurred, a plaintiff may
nonetheless be able to allege a cause of action for contributory infringement
under section 271(c) of the Act. The infringing act in this situation is the sale
of the "component" of the patented machine or the "material or apparatus"
used in the patented method. 179 Section 271(c) provides that the party selling
the component (or material or apparatus) is liable as a contributory infringer
only if the party knows that the component is "especially made or especially
adapted for use in an infringement" of the patent "and not a staple article
or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial non-infringing use. ' 11°
The Supreme Court has ruled that section 271(c) requires a showing that the
alleged contributory infringer "knew that the combination for which his com-
ponent was especially designed was both patented and infringing."' 181
With respect to the contributory infringement of apparatus or machine
claims, the program sold by the software vendor, with the exception of a pre-
programmed ROM, must be transferred from the medium on which it was
sold into the memory of a computer before the program causes the construc-
tion of the patented machine. Once transferred to a computer memory, the
program becomes a "component of a patented machine.""' In other words,
with the exception of a pre-programmed ROM, the thing sold is replicated.
The replica is then used as a component of the machine. In the case of a
pre-programmed ROM, the patented machine will be made when the ROM
is connected to the circuit board of a computer and the computer is turned on.
By way of illustration, consider the person who manufactures and sells
a crank shaft to an engine manufacturer. The engine manufacturer does not
install the crank shaft sold by that person, but uses it as a template in a
duplicating lathe to produce replicas. Thereafter, only the replica crank shafts
are installed in the engines sold by the engine manufacturer. The patent is
on the engine including the crank shaft. Is the crank shaft seller a contributory
infringer? Is he liable for damages as to all engines sold by the engine manufac-
turer? Consider also the case where the first person sells not a crank shaft,
178. At least one court has held that an experimental purpose coupled with minimal com-
mercial activity will excuse a technical infringement. "[Tihere comes a point where what may
be literally a wrong, is of too trifling importance to justify intervention of a court." Condenser
Corp. v. Micamold Radio Corp., 145 F.2d 878, 880 (2d Cir. 1944).
179. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (1982).
180. Id.
181. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 488 (1964).
182. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (1982).
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but the blueprint of a crank shaft. Would the blueprint seller be liable as a
contributory infringer if the blueprint is used to manufacture crank shafts
for the patented engine? Would the outcome be any different if a software
company does not sell programs for a patented machine or process in pro-
gram language recorded on a magnetic medium, but rather, in the form of
a flow chart or printed source code listing? One could argue that either the
flow chart or the printed source code listing is analogous to the blueprint.
Needless to say, the analysis of what exactly constitutes contributory infringe-
ment under section 271(b) involves issues that have yet to be resolved.
In regard to the contributory infringement of method claims, the crucial
question is whether a program in the form of binary code on a magnetic
medium is a "material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process."
In this situation an accused infringer could argue that "material" as used in
section 271(b) means something physical that is consumed by the patented
method, and hence, cannot be a computer program. If this interpretation is
correct, the question that follows is whether the program is an "apparatus."
A pre-programmed ROM may be considered an apparatus. Moreover, a disk
or diskette may also be defined as an apparatus. While it is possible that an
argument that the drafters of section 271(b) did not intend to include com-
puter programs within the terms "material or apparatus" may appeal to some
courts, such an argument is hyper-technical and should not serve to exculpate
an accused infringer who sells programs which cause the infringement of
method claims.
If contributory infringement is not present, a claim that the user induced
infringement of the patent may be the patent owner's only alternative basis
for satisfaction. Under section 271(c), the patent owner must prove that the
program constitutes a material part of the invention, that the program was
sold by one who knew it to be especially made or especially adapted for use
in the infringement, and that the program is not a staple article or commodity
of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use.' These requirements
should be no more difficult to meet in a computer program case than in the
conventional contributory infringement case. They may in fact be easier to
meet, for it is questionable whether any program would be considered a "staple
article." Furthermore, because of the customized nature of programs and the
instructions required for their use, to define a program as a "commodity of
commerce" requires one to stretch considerably the meaning of that term.
Thus, there should be little doubt that the seller of a computer program who
sells the program specifically adapted for use in a patented process or machine,
and instructs such use in the course of selling the program knowing that the
program will in fact be so used, is an active inducer.'
183. See CHisuM, 4 PATENTS § 17.03, at 17-35 to 17-41 (1984).
184. This is the type of activity for which § 271(b) was designed. Cf. Burlington Industries,
Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 379 F. Supp. 754, 757 (D. Md. 1974).
"Inducement," then, under Section 271(b), while requiring active or affirmative
steps to be taken with the knowledge of the likely infringing result, otherwise is as
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Liability for inducing infringement, however, is dependent upon a show-
ing that the conduct induced is itself direct infringement.' 85 It seems likely
that the courts will hold liable an accused infringer who sells a computer pro-
gram that has no significant noninfringing use, even if the seller includes no
instructions specifically directing the user to infringe the patent. A closer case
would arise when the program has both an infringing use and at least one
significant noninfringing use and the seller remains silent as to the manner
in which the program is to be used. In all likelihood, a court will look to
the extent of the noninfringing use and the intent of the seller, with the ultimate
outcome dependent upon the facts of each case. The seller will be expected
to show that the suitability for non-infringing uses is actual and substantial. 
86
The extent of knowledge or intent necessary to constitute active inducement
of infringement under section 271(b) is uncertain.' 8 7 Additionally, because of
the problems inherent in enforcing computer program-related patents under
sections 271(a) and (c), the previously undeveloped doctrine of active induce-
ment of infringement under section 271(b) could become, for the first time,
an important weapon in the arsenal of the patent owner.
If liability for infringement, direct or otherwise, can be established, damages
should always be a consideration in selecting the defendants in a lawsuit. To
satisfy the statutory subject matter requirement of section 101, most patents
involving computer programs necessarily will claim apparatuses or processes
beyond the program itself. Consequently, the program is apt to be only one
portion of the claimed subject matter, and therefore only one portion of the
basis upon which damages can be recovered. To maximize the recovery of
damages, it often may be necessary to pursue the persons who combined the
computer program with the additional claimed subject matter.
By way of illustration, consider a software house selling a Bradley-type
operating system to a computer manufacturer.' 88 The cost of that operating
system may represent the services involved in creating and trouble-shooting
broad in scope as the range of actions by which one may cause, urge, encourage or
aid another to infringe.
Id.
185. See Stukenborg v. Teledyne, Inc., 441 F.2d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 852 (1971).
186. See Fromberg, Inc. v. Thornhill, 315 F.2d 407, 415 (5th Cir. 1963).
187. It is true that knowledge is not required to establish a claim of direct infringement
under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) .... It is also true that 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) does require
proof of such knowledge .... It is not altogether clear that proof of knowledge is
necessary under § 271(b). Most courts have held that knowledge is required under §
271(b) .... however several other factors must be considered. First, § 271(c) does
contain the word "knowing", whereas § 271(b) does not. Second, the special cir-
cumstances covered by § 271(c) may better lend themselves to a knowledge require-
ment .... Finally, it is widely agreed that the intent of Congress in passing § 271
was to codify the law as it existed prior to 1952 .... And there is some prior case
law supporting the position that knowledge is not required in special circumstances.
Kearns v. Wood Motors, Inc., 204 U.S.P.Q. 485, 490 n. 6 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (citations omitted).
188. See supra note 61.
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a single program. The computer manufacturer may then duplicate that pro-
gram for each computer sold. The amount paid to the software house may
represent a small fraction of the total sales of infringing computers by the
computer manufacturer. Clearly, the potential target for maximum recovery
of damages is the computer manufacturer, and consideration should be given
to joining the computer manufacturer in any infringement suit.
IV. CONCLUSION
After the Supreme Court's decision in Parker v. Flook, the patent bar
concluded that few computer program patents would survive the section 101
statutory subject matter test. In the Diehr case, the Supreme Court apparently
changed direction, albeit by a slim one-vote majority. Although the CCPA
and most scholars draw fine lines of distinction between the Flook and Diehr
decisions, it is difficult to consider the Diehr case as anything other than an
abrupt about-face by a majority of the Supreme Court, as the dissent argued
vigorously in Diehr.' " The future for the patentability of computer programs
brightened further after the Supreme Court's holding in Bradley. The deci-
sions of the CCPA subsequent to Diehr and Bradley make it clear that the
CCPA has welcomed the Supreme Court's change in direction, and the CAFC
seems likely to follow. As the law now stands, a practitioner will be remiss
if he overlooks the role patent protection can play in securing the computer
program innovations of his or her clients.
189. See 450 U.S. at 215-16.
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